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The contribution of Royal Navy aircraft carriers and the Fleet Air Arm to 
Operation ‘Overlord’, 1944 
 
During the Second World War, the aircraft carrier moved to the centre of naval strategy. 
Naval aviation (that is, aircraft operating from carriers rather than from bases ashore) 
became the core capability of the modern fleet, its possession the principal distinction 
between the major navies and the minor. This was as true for the Royal Navy as it was 
for the United States and Japan, the other leading naval powers behind which Britain 
had lagged in the early stages of the war.1 The carrier took on the role of capital ship 
first alongside and then increasingly instead of the battleship, due to its ability to 
counter the major warships of the enemy but also to provide protection against 
submarines and air attack, to launch air strikes ashore and to support amphibious 
operations.2 
 
Yet the rise to prominence of naval aviation was far from plain sailing in the Navy that 
had led the way in pioneering it. The role and utility of both elements, the aircraft 
carriers and the aircraft that operated from them, had been hugely controversial in the 
interwar period.3 Its value continued to be intensely debated in the years after the end of 
the Second World War – indeed, it is no exaggeration to state it was the single most 
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recurrent and contentious issue in British defence policy during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Naval aviation was frequently a target for attack by some in the Air Ministry and Royal 
Air Force (RAF), for whom the existence of an air arm outside their control was 
anathema, and also by ministers and officials from other departments who saw a 
convenient target for financial savings. Their case tended to centre on the purported 
ability of land-based air power to either perform the roles of naval aviation at a lower 
cost or to render them strategically irrelevant and unnecessary.4 
 
A similar scepticism can be observed during the Second World War, and from no less a 
figure than the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. While he took great pride in his self-
designation as a ‘former naval person’, such expertise as he had dated from the 
battleship era and he never wholly understood naval aviation, despite having supported 
the Royal Navy’s efforts to regain control of it in the 1930s. During the war he proved 
himself unable to escape the siren calls of the bomber barons with their claims to be 
able to achieve victory through air power, and naval aviation frequently attracted his 
critical attention.5 Churchill’s occasionally disparaging attitude towards naval aviation 
is displayed in an April 1943 memorandum asking the Admiralty for a detailed report 
on the operational performance of the Fleet Air Arm, ‘including sorties, casualty losses 
and damage inflicted on the enemy’. He added, ‘I cannot recall any important offensive 
operation that the Fleet Air Arm has performed since Taranto in 1941 [sic].’6 The 
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Admiralty’s reply will be considered below; for now it is enough to note that the 
contribution of naval aviation was, in the year before D-Day, not obvious even to the 
Prime Minister, a former First Lord of the Admiralty, and that his views have had wider 
influence.7 
 
This article therefore aims to explore the utility of British naval aviation by examining 
its contribution to Operation Overlord, the liberation of Western Europe, and Operation 
Neptune, its assault stage. This provides an appropriate test, being the largest and most 
complex amphibious operation of the war – arguably in all of history. The significance 
of this operation and the challenges it posed would make it natural to assume that naval 
aviation would have played a prominent role, given its centrality to warfare at sea – and 
in particular to amphibious operations – that was established by 1944. Yet carriers were 
nowhere to be seen among the total of more than 7000 ships deployed in direct support 
of the Normandy landings.8 Their absence, reflected in the scarcity of references to 
carriers or naval aviation in the huge literature on D-Day,9 does seem at first glance to 
be rather anomalous. 
 
There are, however, good reasons why carriers were not in evidence off the Normandy 
coast; yet this did not mean that British naval aviation was uninvolved in Operation 
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Overlord. Examining what the carriers and the Fleet Air Arm were doing over this 
period and how they contributed to the landings therefore adds to the understanding 
both of D-Day and also of the role of naval power in the European war. Further, it sheds 
light on the distinctive way in which navies in general and naval aviation in particular 
operate, how they contribute to strategy and warfare more broadly, and how this differs 
from ground forces and land-based air forces. Assuming that their contribution must 
take a similar form to those of the other forces is to overlook these differences, resulting 
in a distorted picture of naval campaigns and their influence on the Second World War 
and more generally. 
 
The article first outlines the size and composition of the Royal Navy’s air arm in the 
summer of 1944. It then examines whether there could have been a useful role for the 
carriers in direct, close support of the Normandy landings, before explaining the 
practical difficulties that pointed against such a use in view of the availability of land-
based air support which, although less than ideal, was adequate. The article then 
assesses the ways in which the Fleet Air Arm10 and the Royal Navy’s carriers 
contributed to Operation Overlord, both directly and indirectly, and also their many 
other roles around the time of D-Day. It argues that their contribution to this operation, 
as well as to other operations and indeed campaigns that were underway 
simultaneously, was enormous – as is revealed in the Admiralty’s reply to the 
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memorandum from Churchill that was quoted above. That this is not always appreciated 
is largely due to the fact that understanding naval warfare, compared to war on land or 
even in the air, requires a broader canvas both geographically and chronologically. In 
other words, a full answer to the question does not emerge from considering the English 
Channel on 6 June 1944 alone but rather requires a bigger map and a longer timescale. 
 
I.  The Royal Navy’s carrier force in June 1944 
 
One serious constraint on the use of naval aviation in support of Operations Neptune 
and Overlord was the small number of carriers in service in the Royal Navy, and the 
small size of the Fleet Air Arm. While this situation was in large part the result of the 
scepticism of Churchill and others about the value of naval aviation, it also had the 
effect of limiting what naval aviation could accomplish, creating something of a vicious 
circle. Even at this late stage of the war, the Royal Navy had only five fleet carriers (that 
is, those capable of conducting the more demanding naval roles, striking heavy enemy 
warships or targets ashore, in the face of heavy air opposition). The Admiralty was well 
aware of the urgent need to get more air power to sea but the first of the new fleet 
carriers that were being built would not come into service until late 1944. The result 
was a series of innovations. The Navy ordered light fleet carriers as a ‘makeshift 
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supplement’ to the fleet carriers, yet their intended rapid completion was delayed by 
design changes to allow them to operate increasingly capable aircraft,11 and none was in 
service by D-Day. 
 
The most urgent need was for air support of convoys. To meet this requirement, the 
Admiralty adopted an idea that it had considered before the war, for ‘auxiliary carriers’, 
later known as ‘escort carriers’, or less formally as ‘Woolworth’ or ‘jeep’ carriers. 
These were either converted merchant ships or purpose-designed but simple ships that 
could be built quickly, with flight decks, catapults, arrestor wires and hangars. 
Compared to a fleet or light fleet carrier, they tended to carry less capable aircraft which 
were adequate given that they were intended for use in mid-Atlantic where they would 
not encounter high-performance enemy fighters. Those operating with the more 
dangerous Russian convoys carried more advanced fighters, as did those modified to 
specialise in supporting amphibious operations, the ‘assault carriers’. Escort carriers 
also operated fewer aircraft – typically around a dozen, mainly Torpedo-Bomber-
Reconnaissance (TBR) aircraft for trade protection, or some 20 fighters for an assault 
escort carrier, compared to 50 or more for a fleet carrier.12 The first escort carrier, HMS 
Audacity, was commissioned in September 1941. Although she was sunk by a U-boat in 
December that same year, her ‘short but brilliant career’ fully vindicated the concept 
and by the end of the war Britain had commissioned 44 such vessels.13 Escort carriers 
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suffered some shortcomings in speed and in ability to operate the modern aircraft that 
eventually came into service in the FAA, yet they were hugely important in freeing (or 
at times supplementing) the fleet carriers for their unique role of countering enemy 
capital ships or heavy land-based aerial opposition. Indeed, so useful were they in view 
of the dire shortage of fleet carriers that many were diverted to fleet tasks, such that 
other improvisations were required for convoy protection.14 
 
In June 1944, an impressive British fleet was being built, comprising four modern fleet 
carriers, 18 light fleet and 10 escort carriers. Many of these would come into service 
before the end of the war and later provided the mainstay of British naval aviation up to 
the 1970s. At the time of the D-Day landings, however, the Royal Navy had only five 
fleet carriers and 30 escort carriers in service. The number of operational aircraft in the 
FAA was also limited; it began the war with no more than 177 aircraft and only passed 
1000 as late as the second quarter of 1945, and suffered delays in getting modern 
aircraft.15 This meant that the FAA could not do everything that the government wished 
and the fact that this was the result of political choices in attaching a relatively low 
priority to naval aviation did not make it any less of a constraint. For example, in 
November 1942 when losses of carriers led the United States to make an urgent request 
for British reinforcement of the Pacific, Britain could only do so at the expense of vital 
commitments in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Even so, HMS Victorious, one of the 
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Royal Navy’s most modern fleet carriers, was sent out though only on the condition that 
the US provided the smaller USS Ranger to strengthen the Home Fleet.16 
 
II.  Use of aircraft carriers off Normandy 
The first question to consider is why aircraft carriers were not used immediately off the 
Normandy beaches in direct support of the landings. The Royal Navy had, after all, 
already used carriers in just this role for operations in Madagascar (the first time it had 
used them in this capacity), North Africa, Sicily and Italy, and would do so again in 
southern France later in 1944. An amphibious assault of this scale, directed against the 
continent where the main strength of the enemy lay, demanded a huge amount of 
supporting air power, not least from fighters both to defend against the enemy air threat 
and also for close support of the troops undertaking the landings and subsequent 
operations ashore. Of all the major amphibious operations conducted during the war, 
however, Operation Neptune benefitted from the greatest provision of friendly air bases 
within range of the landings. This proximity was no happy accident; it was one of the 
principal criteria that narrowed the options for the landings from the whole western 
coast of Europe between northern Norway and Portugal to a shortlist of just two, the Pas 
de Calais area and the Calvados coast of Normandy. Indeed, the Germans expected the 
invasion in the former precisely because they believed the proximity of air bases to be 
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the decisive consideration and this was the closest location to British air bases. 
However, other factors involved in the decision – from the characteristics of the beaches 
to the terrain lying behind them, and notably the achievement of surprise – tipped the 
balance towards Normandy.17 The landings could therefore be supported by fighters 
operating from Britain and the operation need not rely on carrier-based air support. 
 
Yet despite the number of air bases within range of the beaches, there was still a 
potentially valuable role for carrier-based aviation. Fighters operating from southern 
England could operate over the beaches but would be at the edge of their range, 
resulting in less time on patrol, a small proportion of the total force being in action and 
limited responsiveness to requests for support from naval or land forces.18 The Allies 
mitigated the disadvantages of operating from air bases at the edge of fighter range in 
four ways which at this late stage of the war were open to them. First, the planners 
sought a high degree of air superiority as a necessary precondition for the operation to 
go ahead. This long-term effort was achieved as one of the principal effects of the 
combined bomber offensive, which compelled German fighters to give battle and thus 
allowed them to be destroyed in large numbers, and by intensive attacks on Luftwaffe 
bases within range of the Channel. Second, contributing to the diversion of enemy air 
forces as much as that of land forces, the strategic deception campaign aimed to 
disperse German combat power. Third, the Allies now had the luxury of throwing 
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resources at the problem, with overwhelming numbers of aircraft concentrated for 
Neptune and Overlord.19 Fourth, planners placed a high priority on the rapid 
construction of landing strips ashore after D-Day to allow fighters to operate from, or at 
least to refuel and re-arm at, bases in France.20 Nevertheless, the potential disadvantages 
of relatively distant air bases remained, not least given the number of high-value targets 
and the possibility of the Luftwaffe surging its limited strength to overwhelm routine 
Allied patrols. Carriers could in the early stages of the operation have provided a useful 
ready reserve of aircraft based closer to the beaches, where they could spend longer on 
patrol and return to action, refuelled and rearmed, more quickly after a sortie. 
 
However, practical considerations make it hardly surprising that carriers were not used 
off Normandy. These vessels would have needed to steam west to launch aircraft (given 
the prevailing winds in the Channel) and then back east to regain their position.21 Such 
movement parallel to the Normandy coast by carriers and their escorting destroyers 
would have cut perpendicularly across the densely packed shipping lanes heading north-
south between Britain and the invasion beaches, containing the 7000 warships, 
amphibious vessels and craft, and civilian ships supporting the landings. It would also 
have driven a requirement for even more than the 280 minesweepers already committed 
to Operation Neptune to counter German mines, which the naval commander of the 
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Allied expeditionary force, Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay stated were ‘our greatest 
obstacle to success’.22 
 
Given the already daunting congestion at sea due to the huge number of vessels 
involved, often with minimally trained crews, the disruption caused by the use of 
carriers would have been impractical except in dire need. Ramsay (who having 
previously planned the North Africa landings was well aware of the utility of carriers in 
amphibious operations) was evidently concerned about congestion during Operation 
Neptune, turning down a US Army request to use an old Royal Navy carrier for spotting 
aircraft on the grounds of the lack of sea room available.23 The ability to operate fighters 
from British bases, albeit with limitations, was (not least because of the huge number of 
aircraft available) far short of a situation requiring such drastic and disruptive measures. 
Moreover, in addition to the practical difficulties involved in operating carriers in the 
Channel, the number of other calls on them (covered in detail below) suggests that only 
a very pressing need would have seen them used off Normandy, where land-based 
aircraft offered an adequate alternative. The Royal Navy’s carriers represented a scarce 
resource for which there were more urgent needs in other theatres, where no other assets 
could replace them; their comparative advantages were better applied elsewhere. 
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III.  British naval aviation in June 1944: Fleet Air Arm operations from ashore 
 
There were therefore good reasons why the carriers were not operating just off the coast 
of Normandy in June 1944. This does not, however, mean that British naval aviation 
was not supporting Operation Overlord: naval forces do not depend on close proximity 
to support an operation. Their involvement is revealed by gradually broadening the 
focus outwards from the English Channel. 
 
The May 1944 summary of naval air operations noted that, ‘Arrangements have been 
made for the Fleet Air Arm to help the Royal Air Force in forthcoming operations.’24 
This anodyne statement concealed a great deal of activity. 
 
Even without aircraft carriers in the Channel, the FAA participated in the operation, 
from air bases on land. Exploiting the ability of naval aviation to step ashore in this way 
was a familiar practice throughout the war, from the 1940 campaign in France, the 
Dunkirk evacuation and the Battle of Britain onwards,25 with FAA aircraft from land 
bases subsequently operating in the Channel, the Mediterranean, North Africa, the 
Indian Ocean and the Far East. In early 1943, for example, 13 Albacore and Swordfish 
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TBR squadrons were operating from bases in southern England and the Mediterranean 
theatre.26 Later in the year the number had fallen to six squadrons but as the FAA had at 
this time only 34 squadrons of these aircraft, this was still a significant proportion of its 
strength.27 If air bases were available in the right place and if there were military 
advantages in using them, then FAA aircraft did so. Operation Neptune saw just this 
sort of support provided. There was great need for this assistance, not least in filling 
gaps in specialist capabilities that were in particular demand. The planners and air 
commanders were well aware of the potential threat to the operation from German U-
boats,28 their remaining destroyers and small, fast attack craft including E-boats (motor 
torpedo boats) and R-boats (motor gunboats); the E-boats in particular were described 
as ‘the greatest menace to our shipping’.29 
 
Countering these threats was first and foremost the remit of RAF Coastal Command, 
which was responsible for land-based aircraft engaged in maritime operations. Its ability 
to do so effectively was hindered throughout the war by the priorities of the RAF 
leadership, whose single-minded focus on strategic bombing led to the neglect of other 
roles, particularly maritime ones. The result was that Coastal Command truly was a 
‘Cinderella Service’.30 Its weak position was further exacerbated in summer 1944 by the 
diversion of trained manpower to participate in airborne operations: as always, the Air 
Ministry, with Churchill’s backing, sought to protect the bombing campaign at the 
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expense of maritime commitments.31 During Neptune, as at other times during the war, 
Coastal Command badly needed the support of the FAA (which was itself severely 
under-resourced). Coastal strike squadrons would ‘be fully employed outside the 
English Channel’, making FAA aircraft a ‘valuable reinforcement or relief’ against U-
boats and E-boats.32 Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, head of Coastal Command, 
was evidently aware of the weakness of his forces for protecting invasion shipping, 
describing them as ‘inadequate to counter determined and continuous attacks from E, R 
or W/Boats’; he therefore increased the assistance sought from the Navy.33 
 
In January 1944 Churchill suggested that a rather arbitrary figure of 25 per cent of the 
personnel of the FAA should be used in Overlord, a proposal that was welcomed by Air 
Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff.34 Both the Allied Expeditionary 
Air Force and the RAF requested large-scale support from the Navy, which amounted to 
a significant proportion of its meagre force. The Admiralty’s initial offer comprised 30 
TBR aircraft and 50 fighters yet the demand from the air side was considerably greater: 
the air forces requested a total of 48 TBR aircraft and 232 fighters, which represented 
21 per cent and precisely 100 per cent, respectively, of the FAA’s operational strength.35 
The Admiralty response was broadly positive, while pointing out that fully meeting 
these requests would prevent the Navy from conducting other priority tasks such as 
further planned landings in Europe, notably Operation Anvil (the invasion of southern 
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France), for which five escort carriers were earmarked; it would delay the entry into 
service of one fleet carrier and two escort carriers, and would postpone reinforcement of 
the British Pacific Fleet by three and a half months.36 The initial request therefore had to 
be scaled back, with even Portal commenting that ‘he thought it would be a mistake to 
immobilise any fleet carriers’. The Chiefs of Staff recommended reallocations of FAA 
aircraft that would impact escort carriers but not those that would immobilise the 
scarcer and more capable fleet carriers.37 The result was nonetheless a sizeable FAA 
deployment from air bases ashore in direct and indirect support of Operation Neptune. 
 
The first response to any soldier or marine on the D-Day beaches who asked where was 
the FAA, would be ‘look up’. A Naval Fighter Wing of 42 Seafires provided aerial 
spotting to enhance the accuracy of the naval gunfire that was one of the principal 
Allied advantages and a key element of the plan to suppress and destroy the German 
defences. These four squadrons served alongside two from the RAF and one from the 
US Navy, all operating from a Royal Naval Air Station at Lee-on-Solent near 
Southampton.38 During the planning stage, one senior RAF officer described the 
spotting role of fighters as being ‘of primary importance to Overlord’.39 Afterwards, the 
official report on naval gunfire support noted the important contribution made to this 
key capability by aerial spotting: ‘all ships’ reports, British and American, and the Force 
Commanders comment on the effectiveness of air spotting’; it also cited Ramsay’s 
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judgement that, ‘Spotting from single-seaters, never before undertaken on anything like 
such a grand scale, was on the whole a great success.’40 When the Seafires were not 
required for spotting, they conducted offensive and fighter escort duties during which 
they destroyed or damaged seven enemy aircraft and also four human torpedoes being 
used against shipping.41 
 
Moving the geographical spotlight a little further out, several TBR squadrons operated 
from shore bases alongside Coastal Command. Four squadrons totalling 48 aircraft were 
based at Manston and Hawkinge in Kent. They patrolled off the Dutch and Belgian 
coasts and in the Channel, against enemy surface warships and U-boats, which were 
expected to surge from their bases at Brest and on the French Biscay coast into the 
Channel when the invasion began.42 They also laid smoke screens to protect convoys in 
the Channel, provided illumination for attacks by light coastal forces and shot down two 
V1 flying bombs.43 Another four squadrons of 48 TBR aircraft operated from south-
west England, three from Perranporth in Cornwall and one from Harrowbeer in 
Devon.44 They conducted anti-submarine patrols in the Southwest Approaches which, 
as noted above, was the direction from which the principal U-boat threat would emerge. 
In this role the ability of the FAA aircraft to operate at night was particularly useful 
while more broadly their presence freed up longer-range aircraft of the hard-pressed 
Coastal Command to operate further off, including in the Bay of Biscay.45 In the event, 
18 
 
Allied precautions against the U-boats proved remarkably successful: ‘Of the twenty-
five U-boats ordered up the Channel in June, five abandoned the attempt, seven were 
sunk, and three were damaged sufficiently to send them back to base.’46 Throughout the 
whole of June 1944, only two small merchant ships were sunk in the North Atlantic, in 
exchange for the destruction of 25 U-boats.47 The efforts of the Fleet Air Arm, from 
carriers and ashore, were an integral part of this hugely successful joint-service effort. 
 
The FAA also provided indirect, more distant support to Operation Neptune as further 
squadrons, or flights from squadrons, totalling 36 TBR aircraft and 83 fighters deployed 
in the north of the country. Northern Ireland hosted 28 fighters and six TBR aircraft, the 
Orkneys 25 fighters (mainly for air defence of the naval base at Scapa Flow), with a 
further 10 fighters and 30 TBR aircraft on the west coast of Scotland and 20 fighters on 
the east coast.48 The deployment of FAA fighters ashore to provide air defence against 
the limited but real threat from the Luftwaffe freed RAF aircraft to shift southwards; the 
Chief of the Air Staff thanked the First Sea Lord for this loan: ‘Your assistance did 
much to remove the anxiety we felt at having to uncover so much of the country to 
surprise air attacks while the bulk of our forces were engaged in the South.’49 The 
additional fighters thereby relocated were all the more welcome given the additional 
requirements driven by the planners’ increase in the size of the initial assault from three 
divisions to five, resulting in two more landing forces and two more beaches that 
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needed fighter cover and air support.50 The TBR aircraft provided additional capacity in 
case of movements of the German fleet – which, as explained below, was arguably the 
greatest potential threat to Operation Neptune – or attempts to relocate U-boats from 
northern waters towards the Channel. 
 
In total, therefore, 125 fighters and 132 TBR aircraft from the FAA operated from shore 
bases in support of the Normandy landings, representing respectively about one third 
and about 40 per cent of its operational strength.51 This commitment came at the cost of 
delaying by two months the entry into service of two trade protection escort carriers that 
were undergoing repairs; others were switched to the aircraft ferry role or had their air 
groups thinned out for the duration of the landings (often losing their more experienced 
pilots); and all Merchant Aircraft Carriers lost one aircraft for service ashore.52 This 
contribution was valued by the Chief of the Air Staff, as quoted above, and also by 
Douglas, the head of Coastal Command. Among all senior RAF officers, the latter was 
the most keenly aware of the shortfall between the resources of Coastal Command and 
the demands for its services during the Normandy landings. It is therefore noteworthy 
that he not only repeatedly increased his requests for FAA support but also in July 
resisted attempts by the Admiralty to reclaim naval aircraft as had been agreed, arguing 
that to do so would ‘deprive me of an extremely valuable addition to the A/U [anti-U-
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boat] forces at my disposal, at a time when the activity of U-boats in the Channel Area 
is, if anything, on the increase.’53 
 
IV.  Carriers in more distant support to Operation Neptune 
 
In addition to supporting Operation Neptune from ashore, British naval aviation also did 
so from carriers, albeit not from right off the landing beaches. Three escort carriers 
deployed in the Southwest Approaches in support of the effort against the German U-
boats. These carriers did not engage in anti-submarine warfare themselves but rather 
provided fighter cover for Coastal Command aircraft, which were otherwise vulnerable 
to long-range German fighters, and for naval escorts that were hunting U-boats.54 
 
Further away, two fleet carriers (Furious and Victorious) and one escort carrier 
(Trumpeter) were operating with the Home Fleet from Scapa Flow alongside three 
battleships.55 The principal role of this force was the traditional one of the capital ship – 
neutralising the heavy units of the enemy fleet. They had achieved an important success 
in April with Operation Tungsten, the successful attack on the Tirpitz – the most 
powerful warship in European waters. This formidable battleship had been contained in 
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Norwegian fjords for some time, though it had in turn acted as a ‘fleet in being’, pinning 
down Royal Navy battleships and carriers to counter it. The FAA attack was conducted 
by strike aircraft from Furious and Victorious, accompanied by fighters from these two 
ships and three escort carriers for escort and flak suppression; a fourth escort carrier, 
supported by Furious, provided air and anti-submarine defence for the whole carrier 
force. It knocked out Tirpitz for three months, ensuring that she could not interfere with 
operations to the south.56 Thereafter, the Home Fleet provided cover against a possible 
sortie by the remaining heavy units of the German fleet. This was a potentially 
formidable force, comprising the pocket battleships Admiral Scheer and Lützow, heavy 
cruisers Prinz Eugen and Admiral Hipper, plus four light cruisers and numerous 
destroyers. The official historian of the US Navy perceived an element of excessive 
caution and over insurance in British plans to deal with German heavy surface forces.57 
However, there is much hindsight in this judgement, not least because the Allies were 
not at the time aware of the poor readiness of the German fleet; the only capital ships 
known to be out of action were the battleships Tirpitz and Gneisenau, which still left the 
significant potential threat listed above. Morison’s British counterpart takes a 
contrasting view, noting the possibility of a sortie against the landings, or indeed against 
convoys to Russia.58 The planners could not take the Kriegsmarine’s passivity for 
granted and the initial joint plan of February 1944 stated unequivocally: ‘When it 
becomes clear to the enemy that a full-scale invasion is developing, it is probable that 
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all his available Naval forces will be used against our operations to the full extent of 
their capabilities.’59 
 
In case the German fleet should head towards the Channel, Admiral Ramsay had 
devised ‘Operation Hermetic’ to counter them, with Coastal Command attacking en 
route, and then the commander of the British Eastern Task Force gathering the 
battleships and cruisers in the bombardment force and from Portsmouth to engage the 
Germans in a decisive battle.60 The Home Fleet in the north, including the two fleet 
carriers, provided cover against the more probable case of the Germans heading out into 
the Atlantic to disrupt shipping; this possibility had been highlighted by Coastal 
Command, which warned that it would only be able to provide reconnaissance so the 
‘Home Fleet will accept entire responsibility’ for this scenario.61 
 
The cover role is easily disregarded but the result was that the Allied forces in the 
Channel escorting the landing convoys, and those protecting shipping in the Atlantic or 
northern waters, would not need to face anything larger than destroyers. Carriers, with 
battleships in support, had provided cover during the amphibious operations in 
Madagascar, North Africa, Sicily and Salerno, in order to ensure that heavy enemy 
surface ships, the greatest potential threat to an amphibious operation, could not 
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interfere. The difference in summer 1944 was that in contrast to the situation in the 
Mediterranean, the German capital ships were contained far from the area of the 
landings, so the cover force was also more distant – and hence liable to be overlooked. 
Whether a sortie by the German fleet was successfully deterred or simply never planned 
is irrelevant; guarding against it was an inescapable requirement for Operation 
Overlord. 
 
Moreover, the cover role should not be thought of as inactive. The warships earmarked 
for it were also performing other roles at the same time. As well as knocking out Tirpitz, 
the Home Fleet carriers launched strikes against enemy shipping in Norwegian waters 
both before and after D-Day. In addition to the direct losses inflicted on the enemy, 
including to imports of iron ore as well as food, these strikes – alongside attacks on 
targets ashore and obvious armed reconnaissance of likely landing beaches – were also 
designed to support the strategic deception campaign. This long-term effort was one of 
the necessary preconditions for Overlord, aiming as it did to confuse the opponent as to 
where and when the main landing would take place. One element of it, ‘Fortitude 
North’, sought to maintain the German belief that the Allies were going to land in 
Norway before their main effort in the Pas de Calais. It is difficult to precisely identify 
the effect of this element of the wider deception campaign but at the very least Germany 
did retain in Norway significant land forces and, particularly useful for Operation 
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Neptune, 30 U-boats.62 While providing cover for operations in the Channel and 
working to divert enemy forces from there, the Home Fleet was simultaneously 
supporting convoys to Russia, standing ready to protect them against any heavy surface 
threat that would overmatch their regular escort (which always included escort carriers, 
against the air and U-boat threats). Indeed, the strike on Tirpitz in April was coordinated 
with Convoy JA58 to Russia, so the latter would help to draw off enemy reconnaissance 
aircraft and U-boats.63 
 
V.  Carrier operations in other theatres 
 
Royal Navy carriers were also performing other roles, not connected with the invasion 
of North-Western Europe; it is striking that when the First Sea Lord later listed his main 
concerns in the early part of 1944, they did not include the Normandy invasion but 
rather emphasised the Mediterranean, the East Indies and the Far East.64 Indeed, the 
need to balance support for Operation Neptune with the Navy’s other commitments was 
precisely why the huge initial request from the air commanders for FAA aircraft to 
operate from ashore in support of the landings had to be scaled back: ‘The repercussions 
on both European and Pacific strategy of meeting the full RAF requirements from the 
FAA for Overlord are too great to be acceptable.’65 
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One of these roles was supporting planned amphibious operations in the Mediterranean, 
several of which took place in areas that were beyond the range of land-based aircraft. 
Three escort carriers deployed there in late May to prepare, providing air defence for 
convoys as they did so, while a third of their aircraft operated from bases ashore with 
the army in Italy, gaining experience in providing close air support.66 Two others were 
working up in British waters for this combined operations role. In August, seven British 
escort carriers with 166 fighters, together with two US carriers with 48 aircraft, 
supported Operation Dragoon, the Allied invasion of southern France; when released 
from this task the seven British ships headed for Alexandria, from where they supported 
the liberation of the Greek Aegean islands and covered operations off Crete.67 
 
The most important commitment not connected with D-Day was the growing British 
naval presence in the Indian Ocean and Pacific. A British carrier had previously served 
there when Victorious deployed between March and August 1943, at the request of the 
US after losses to their carriers left them with just two against Japan’s six.68 By summer 
1944, the Far East was starting to become the principal focus for the British carrier 
force. While two fleet carriers were, as explained above, attached to the Home Fleet at 
the time of D-Day, a third, Illustrious, supported by an escort carrier, was deployed with 
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the Eastern Fleet and operating in a combined Allied force with the USS Saratoga. In 
April they attacked Japanese targets at Sabang on the north-east tip of Sumatra, 
including airfields (destroying 24 aircraft on the ground), oil storage tanks, port 
installations and shipping. In May, they hit an oil refinery, engineering works, a 
dockyard and shipping at Sourabaya in Java. In June, Illustrious struck Port Blair in the 
Andaman Islands, including targets such as an airfield, two radar stations, a power 
station and a seaplane base. In July, she returned to attack the Japanese naval base at 
Sabang, this time in company with a second Royal Navy fleet carrier, the Victorious, 
recently arrived from the northern Atlantic having been freed from the role of covering 
Operation Neptune.69 
 
Playing a significant part in the war against Japan was a strategic priority for Britain, on 
political and diplomatic grounds as well as military. Clearly the geography of the 
theatre meant that British land-based air power would have a very limited role, and gave 
much value to carrier-based aircraft. Illustrious was the vanguard of this effort, gaining 
experience of operating there with the Americans that would prove invaluable for the 
expanded British Pacific Fleet that was planned for later in the year. The fourth fleet 
carrier, Formidable, had finished a refit in May and was already en route for the Eastern 
Fleet on D-Day, while the fifth, Indomitable was working up in the Clyde having 
recently completed repairs in the US before also heading out east on 12 June. It was not 
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only fleet carriers that were serving in the Eastern Fleet at the time of D-Day: five escort 
carriers were also attached to it, mainly in an anti-submarine role. Others would follow 
in the months to come. The force was supported by HMS Unicorn, a purpose-designed 
aircraft maintenance carrier, which helped to reduce the Fleet’s dependence on bases 
ashore.70 By June 1944 the balance of advantage in the war at sea in the European 
theatre had tilted to the extent that Britain’s capital ships could begin to shift focus to 
the Far East. By November, the British Pacific Fleet included five fleet carriers, four 
escort carriers and an aircraft repair ship, with another five escort carriers with the East 
Indies Fleet.71 
 
The growing rebalance to the Eastern theatre brings to light a broader point about the 
contribution of the carriers to the Normandy landings: it is deeply misleading to assess 
this by examining the locations or activities of these vessels solely on 6 June 1944. 
Much of their vital contribution to the invasion of Europe had been provided in the 
months and years beforehand, establishing the necessary conditions for the preparation 
and conduct of Operation Overlord. First, they had helped to secure the command of the 
sea in the Atlantic that was necessary to transport to Britain the men and material that 
would liberate Europe. This campaign involved neutralising German capital ships by 
sinking them or containing them in port (in which carriers and battleships were partners) 
and also helping to protect shipping against the U-boat and air threats. Second, they had 
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helped to open up the Mediterranean, which eased the burden on allied shipping 
(arguably their most critical shortage) while also diverting and wearing down German 
strength, and gaining valuable experience in amphibious operations. Further, at the time 
of D-Day several escort carriers were operating with the Atlantic convoys, protecting 
shipping that carried the reinforcements and supplies required for the on-going 
campaign to liberate Western Europe. A full understanding of the contribution to 
Operation Neptune of naval aviation therefore requires a longer timeline than simply 
focussing on the day of the landings alone. 
 
VI.  Summary: British aircraft carriers on D-Day 
 
So what were the Royal Navy’s carriers doing in the first week of June 1944?72 Of the 
five fleet carriers, Furious and Victorious were serving with the Home Fleet; having 
knocked out Tirpitz they acted as cover against the rest of the German surface fleet and 
supported the strategic deception campaign. Illustrious was attached to the Eastern 
Fleet, where she would shortly be joined by Formidable (en route) and Indomitable 
(within a week of sailing). That is, two were playing the classic role of the capital ship 
in support of Operation Neptune, ensuring that the ships conducting it would not have to 
29 
 
face any enemy forces more capable than a light cruiser, while the other three were 
involved in the emerging focus of British naval effort in the East. 
 
The Royal Navy commissioned 44 escort carriers during the war; on 6 June 1944, three 
had been sunk (Audacity, Avenger and Dasher) and eleven were yet to complete, either 
still building or converting, or working up.73 This left 30 escort carriers in service on D-
Day. One (Trumpeter) was supporting the Home Fleet while working up. Three 
(Emperor, Pursuer, Tracker) were providing fighter cover for anti-submarine operations 
in the Southwest Approaches, in cooperation with warships and land-based maritime 
aircraft. Five (Attacker, Hunter, Khedive, Speaker, Stalker) were preparing for later 
amphibious operations in the Mediterranean – some working with convoys in the 
Western Mediterranean as they did so. Nine were protecting merchant shipping, seven 
in the Atlantic (Biter, Campania, Empress, Nairana, Searcher, Striker and Vindex) and 
two between Britain and Russia (Activity and Fencer). Five were serving with or 
heading out to join the Eastern Fleet (Ameer, Atheling, Battler, Begum and Shah). Three 
(Archer, Queen and Ruler) were, like several of the escort carriers that were working 
up, ferrying aircraft overseas, thereby lending the strategic mobility of sea power to 
land-based aircraft. Two (Chaser and Slinger) were repairing; one (Ravager) was 
training pilots in deck landing and one (Pretoria Castle) was conducting trials of new 
aircraft. Three other, older carriers were conducting similar activities: two former 
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seaplane carriers, Athene and Engadine, were ferrying aircraft; the elderly Argus was 
engaged in deck landing training.74 Finally, the maintenance carrier Unicorn was 
supporting the Eastern Fleet. Taking these four and the 30 operational escort carriers 
together, four were directly involved in Neptune (three locally, one at a distance) with 
another nine supporting indirectly, protecting trade in the Atlantic; 10 were in or 
heading to other theatres, evenly split between the Mediterranean and the Pacific; five 
were ferrying aircraft, four supporting other carriers (trials, training and repair) and two 
were undergoing repairs of damage suffered in previous operations. 
 
What emerges most clearly from this summary, together with the earlier section on 
FAA aircraft operating from ashore, is the huge breadth of roles that British naval 
aviation was undertaking. These encompassed the whole span of the activities of naval 
power, from transporting friendly forces, to protecting shipping; from providing cover 
against the enemy fleet, to supporting amphibious operations. These activities were 
taking place all over the world, contributing to a range of campaigns at sea and ashore – 
and providing ammunition for use against critics at home. 
 
VII.  The Admiralty reply to Churchill 
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This article began by noting Winston Churchill’s questioning of the value of naval 
aviation. He initially wrote to the Admiralty on 8 April 1943 asking for periodic reports 
on the activities of the FAA ‘along the same lines’ as the RAF produced regarding 
Bomber Command (perhaps suggesting where this démarche might have originated).75 
Discussing their reply, senior officials in the Admiralty noted that the statistics he 
sought would be difficult to compile since the FAA was not separable from the rest of 
the Navy, and might not be very revealing, not least because: ‘They need to be read in 
the light of what might have happened if aircraft had not been present, or in the light of 
what might happen if the fleet and carrier threat did not exist to any German surface 
vessels operating in the Atlantic.’76 The First Lord replied to Churchill, pointing out the 
difficulty of attempting to ‘give an adequate picture of the whole of the work of the 
Fleet Air Arm’, because it was not a separate command but rather an integral part of the 
fleet. Its reconnaissance or anti-submarine work, for example, was not separately 
recorded any more than was that of navy minesweepers.77 
 
Churchill’s refusal to accept this response resulted in his minute cited above demanding 
a detailed account of the performance of the FAA because, ‘I cannot recall any 
important offensive operation that the Fleet Air Arm has performed since Taranto.’78 
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The Admiralty provided an enlightening response to this failure of the prime ministerial 
memory, with the first of what became a quarterly report on the activities of naval 
aviation. Responding to Churchill’s jibe, it set out in an appendix the full range of FAA 
achievements since November 1940. It listed 21 ‘major incidents’, some of which 
would no doubt have been familiar to Churchill. These covered the full range of naval 
roles: countering enemy warships (including the sinking of the battleship Bismarck; the 
battle of Cape Matapan at which three Italian heavy cruisers were sunk and one Italian 
battleship badly damaged; sinking enemy destroyers in the Red Sea; and attacking 
coastal forces in the Channel), attacking enemy shipping (for example, off Greece and 
off Syria, and from Malta), attacking targets ashore (including a dam in Sardinia, 
facilities in the Norwegian harbours of Kirkenes and Petsamo, and airfields and 
harbours in the Eastern Mediterranean), spotting for naval gunfire against targets ashore 
in Italy and North Africa, supporting amphibious operations (in Madagascar and in 
North Africa where, the paper noted, the FAA had destroyed 60 enemy aircraft and even 
captured an airfield), supporting Army operations in North Africa, protecting convoys 
in the Mediterranean (notably Operation Pedestal to Malta) and to Russia, and 
transporting 864 RAF fighters to overseas theatres.79 
 
Churchill was still not wholly convinced, complaining that the paper showed the FAA 
was clearly not contributing much to the war because it had not suffered enough 
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casualties over the preceding three months.80 After much internal debate within the 
Admiralty, it simply recorded, ‘the First Lord does not intend to reply to the PM’s 
minute unless the PM raises the matter again’.81 Perhaps it was too late to re-educate a 
senior politician in the realities of modern naval power and, in particular, the full range 
and variety of roles of naval aviation which defined simplistic statistical summaries. 
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
 
The aim of this article was to assess the ways in which British naval aviation supported 
Operation Overlord. It has shown that while there could have been a useful role for 
carrier-based aircraft in Operation Neptune, despite the availability of land-based air 
power to cover the landings, there were good practical reasons why the carriers were not 
used immediately off the Normandy beaches. Foremost among these were the sea 
congestion that their presence would have caused and the greater need elsewhere for the 
comparative advantages of what was still a small force. The fact that carriers were not in 
the immediate vicinity of the landings did not, however, mean that naval aviation was 
failing to support the operation. First, a substantial proportion of the FAA was operating 
from land bases, using its specialist expertise either to support the landings directly or to 
free other, land-based aircraft to do so. Second, two out of the five fleet carriers and 
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several escort carriers were engaged in Operation Neptune, albeit from some distance 
away. The other fleet carriers and escort carriers were conducting the many other 
activities of naval power, which continued throughout the Normandy campaign, and in 
the other theatres where British naval power had commitments. 
 
Given the deep and bitter disputes over naval aviation in the interwar period, early in the 
Second World War and also post-war, it is striking that there is no evidence of any 
controversy between the services over the role of naval aviation in support of Overlord. 
There were some debates but they were characterised by a harmony that was quite 
unusual for this particular subject. The initial RAF request for support from the Fleet 
Air Arm was so great that it would have had detrimental effects on other naval 
operations but when the Admiralty pointed out these implications, the matter was 
resolved amicably with a compromise. The only – minor – area of disagreement saw the 
head of Coastal Command seeking to retain the aircraft loaned from the FAA for longer 
than had initially been agreed. Broadly, though, consensus reigned – in stark contrast to 
earlier in the war, or indeed in the postwar period. By 1944, the main wartime disputes 
over strategy and roles for the armed services had been resolved and resources were 
relatively plentiful; these two favourable conditions reduced the grounds for inter- (and 
indeed intra-) service competition. When the positive climate changed, the old disputes 
would recur with a vengeance. 
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A number of points emerge from this analysis regarding the idiosyncrasies of naval 
power, distinguishing it from warfare on land or in the air (albeit with more similarities 
to the latter than to the former). 
 
First, naval campaigns take place and naval forces operate over a larger geographic 
canvas; a narrow focus on the waters between the Isle of Wight and the Calvados coast 
overlooks much of what naval aviation was doing in support of Operation Neptune, 
whether this was operating off Norway to guard against the remaining units of the 
German fleet, or protecting shipping far out in the Atlantic. Moreover, the Royal Navy 
in June 1944 did not have the luxury of concentrating solely on the Channel or even 
Home and Atlantic waters but was also operating in the Mediterranean and the East. 
These theatres were more closely interconnected at sea than on land or in the air, with 
forces moving between them more rapidly and more frequently. For example, less than 
a week after covering the D-Day landings, HMS Victorious was en route for the Pacific. 
The escort carrier HMS Emperor was off Norway in April and May 1944, countering 
the enemy fleet and attacking targets ashore; then in the Southwest Approaches on 6 
June, providing air cover for the forces protecting the D-Day landings from U-boats; 
then supporting amphibious operations in the Mediterranean in July and August. To 
36 
 
understand naval power, a bigger map is required, reflecting the global scope of British 
strategy. 
 
Second, it is misleading to focus on 6 June alone. Much of the naval support to D-Day 
had been provided in the months, even years beforehand – helping to win the Battle of 
the Atlantic, contributing to the opening up of the Mediterranean, putting into place the 
preconditions and the forces for the liberation of Western Europe. While many elements 
of naval power had a role on 6 June itself, others had moved on to begin building up the 
next focus of British strategy, in the Pacific. Naval support to the campaign in Western 
Europe also continued long after D-Day, as the forces that landed that day had to be 
reinforced and supplied over the following months. The naval role in Neptune and 
Overlord can only be understood if a suitably broad timescale is considered. 
 
Many of these campaigns were conducted alongside land-based ground and air forces, 
or were intended to assist these forces in their own campaigns on land. Yet this 
cooperation and support did not necessarily require naval forces to be located in close 
proximity to their sister services, or even to be acting at the same time. Just because the 
soldier on the beaches of Normandy or the RAF pilot flying above them could not see 
British carriers did not mean that they were not involved in Operation Neptune. The 
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contribution of naval forces in general and of naval aviation in particular is easily 
misunderstood because it is different to that of land and air forces. Their involvement at 
D-Day, and in other wartime campaigns, requires more than the cursory examination 
that some observers are prepared to give, even those inhabiting Number 10 Downing 
Street: Churchill demonstrated on several occasions during the war that his grasp of 
contemporary naval matters was not quite as firm as he liked to think. 
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